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HARM TO SELF. By Joel Feinberg.! New York, N.Y.: Ox-
ford University Press. 1986. Pp. xxiii, 420. $29.95. 
John Stick2 
For all the fanfares and fears that have heralded the rise of 
interdisciplinary studies in legal academia, constitutional lawyers 
and political philosophers still tend to do their everyday work in 
isolation from each other. The use of political philosophy in consti-
tutionallaw is identified with the construction of grand theory: one 
looks to philosophy for the sweeping generalization that will put all 
the chaotic holdings together as pieces of a smooth arch, or for the 
indisputable foundation for a stinging criticism of the Supreme 
Court's latest failure to protect a fundamental right. Philosophy is 
at least as useful to lawyers, however, for the more mundane task of 
generating examples and subtle distinctions that are helpful in the 
manipulation of doctrine. Professor Joel Feinberg's Harm to Self, 
the third of four volumes in his series The Moral Limits of the Crim-
inal Law, is not grand theory, but will nevertheless repay careful 
examination by any constitutional lawyer interested in paternalism 
and its corollary issues: consent, voluntariness, coercion, duress, 
unconscionability, and assumption of risk. Professor Feinberg, one 
of our most distinguished moral philosophers, has written a defense 
of the standard liberal position that paternalism is not a sufficient 
justification for making an activity a crime. He devotes much care-
ful attention to the counter-examples commonly put forward by 
critics of the liberal position, and thoroughly delineates the bounda-
ries of paternalistic, and thus unjustifiable, regulation. The book is 
clearly written, closely argued, and liberally strewn with legal 
examples. 
Paternalism generates perennial philosophical and legal debate 
because, as Feinberg points out, there are strongly persuasive pre-
sumptive cases both for and against it. Many laws, some obviously 
good, seem to have paternalism as an essential part of their implicit 
rationales, yet allowing paternalistic interferences seems to lead 
down a slippery slope to a huge degree of state control. Moreover, 
any degree of paternalism is odious to personal autonomy. Fein-
berg attempts to save many of the attractive laws that seem to em-
body paternalistic premises, without sliding down the slippery 
slope, by distinguishing between hard and soft paternalism, and em-
bracing only the latter. Soft paternalism allows state intervention to 
I. Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Arizona. 
2. Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law. 
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assure that the individual's self-harming choice is truly voluntary: 
that it is made rationally, not in ignorance of the facts, and without 
coercion. Soft paternalism is thus consistent with classical liber-
alism, and is not really paternalism at all. 
A lawyer could best think of this book as a sophisticated trea-
tise on the philosophical debates concerning paternalism, voluntari-
ness, consent, and coercion. The overall argument follows the 
liberal tradition and the previous philosophical literature on pater-
nalism: a minute dissection and judicious assessment of the various 
positions and arguments is prized above novel interpretations. 
(Which is not to say that Professor Feinberg has no new points to 
make; only that his originality consists for the most part in 
strengthening, refining, and extending the received tradition.) The 
research is the most complete of the existing sources; anyone who 
wants a guide into the philosophical literature on paternalism 
should start here.3 The seeker will find a wealth of examples, 
counter-examples, and fine distinctions among various possible po-
sitions. Much more than grand theory, the reader will find all the 
building blocks for constructing doctrinal argument except the case 
holdings (and sometimes even those). 
A brief description of the first of two chapters on coercion will 
give a representative idea of Professor Feinberg's method of pro-
ceeding. The background issue is to determine when person B's 
consent will validate a course of action by A that will likely be 
harmful to B and thus foreclose the state from restraining or pun-
ishing A. B's consent will not be valid if it is coerced. The degrees 
of force used to coerce are first described in a spectrum, with four 
gradations of compulsion and coercion described and illustrated 
with examples. Difficult cases to classify are also identified and dis-
cussed. The possible sources of coercive pressure-A, a third party 
(C), or natural causes-are catalogued. The implications of invalid 
consent-A's criminal liability and the privilege of a third party (D) 
to intervene forcibly to protect B-are elucidated in light of the var-
ious sources of coercive pressure. The chapter then tackles the diffi-
cult question of how much coercion is necessary to invalidate 
consent. Four possible measures of coercive pressure, taken from 
the philosophic literature, are deployed against a wide range of ex-
amples. Complicating issues (of great interest to lawyers), such as 
whether to use subjective or objective standards to measure the 
pressure felt by the consenter, whether the description of coercion 
3. Other useful works include J. KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1983), and PATERNALISM 
(R. Sartorius ed. 1983), which collects some of the most influential articles in the philosophi-
cal literature. 
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can refer only to psychological states or must include a component 
of moral evaluation, whether offers as well as threats can be coer-
cive, and whether coercion can be understood apart from a baseline 
of morally expected conduct, are all discussed at length with much 
good sense and many illuminating examples. Because the analysis 
is so dependent on the common-sense weighing of examples, no one 
will find the entire analysis compelling. (The examples involving 
women, for example, although not offensively sexist, do seem un-
touched by feminism.) But precisely by being so exhaustive in cate-
gorization and explicit in examples, Feinberg gives the reader every 
opportunity to pinpoint the extent and effect of intuitive 
disagreements. 
The limitations of the book, for the constitutional lawyer, flow 
from its place as a volume in a series on moral philosophy and the 
criminal law. Although Feinberg includes discussions of doctrines 
related to criminal topic~ntract law is often examined to illumi-
nate issues concerning the defense that the victim consented-the 
focus remains upon the standard criminal examples. Current con-
stitutional issues are often barely discussed. For example, the con-
servative attack on a wide range of economic regulation, including 
consumer protection legislation, protection of occupational health 
and safety, and the regulation of private pension plans, rests in part 
on the idea that all such regulations are paternalistic, and that pa-
ternalism is not a sufficient reason for interfering with individual 
liberty. Feinberg discusses such statutes only briefly, to suggest that 
the rationale for them is not paternalistic (i.e., not to protect con-
sumers from the results of their own voluntary choices), but instead 
to avoid various forms of market failure that render consumers un-
able to achieve their own voluntary desires. 4 This is an adequate 
response to the philosophical literature, but not to the legal litera-
ture where the analysis of Law and Economics scholars, if accepted, 
would undercut Feinberg's alternative justification for the statutes, 
leaving paternalism central. But the constitutional lawyer willing to 
apply Feinberg's analysis herself will still find much of value in his 
discussion of criminal and private law examples. 
The lawyer seeking to use Feinberg as a guide to the secondary 
literature will find it limited in its tight preoccupation with the liter-
ature of moral philosophy. For example, during his discussion of 
the limits on personal autonomy Feinberg discusses the puzzles 
arising from the attempt to make a decision binding on one's later 
self, who at the later time may prefer not to be bound. (The classi-
4. John Kleinig makes a similar argument with regard to social security. See J. 
KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 165-67. 
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cal example, which Feinberg discusses, is Ulysses binding himself to 
the mast where he could hear but not follow the sirens.) Most legal 
scholars would want an assessment of the rational choice literature 
on the topic, including Jon Elster's book, Ulysses and the Sirens. 
Elster is not even cited, nor indeed is any of the economic or polit-
ical science literature on social or rational choice. Such weaknesses 
of the book are only the limitations of its virtues: the comprehen-
sive treatment of the philosophical literature should not mislead us 
to ask for more than Professor Feinberg ever promised to deliver. 
By contrast to his comprehensive elaboration of a liberal classi-
fication of paternalistic regulation, Feinberg devotes much less 
space to defending the liberal point of view from its detractors. Not 
surprisingly, the broader political argument against paternalism is 
the least convincing quarter of the book; ultimately, paternalism is 
one of those ethical problems that stubbornly resists being dissolved 
by any theorist. Feinberg's line of attack is to emphasize the funda-
mental value of personal autonomy. To give definition to the pro-
tean concept of autonomy, he uses the analogy of state sovereignty. 
Hard paternalism is unjustifiable because it is degrading: it is incon-
sistent with personal autonomy understood as personal sovereignty. 
To make this argument work, Feinberg must convince us first that 
the analogy between persons and nations is sufficiently close that 
the concept of sovereignty can be transported usefully. Second, na-
tional sovereignty must be held forth as an attractive moral ideal. 
Neither part of the argument is fully convincing. International rela-
tions are famous for being beyond the reaches of the normal appli-
cation of both moral and legal principles. Some philosophers of law 
dispute whether international law is law at all; the standards of 
moral accountability of nations often seem similarly debased. The-
orists looking for a modern equivalent to the Hobbesian state of 
nature often point to the dealings of nations. The sovereignty de-
manded by national governments would seem to be the single larg-
est factor in perpetuating the unsatisfactory nature of the law and 
morality of international affairs. And just those features that lessen 
the moral attractiveness of the concept of national sovereignty also 
make it less analogous to the situation of the individual in society. 
Nations are not as dependent on one another as are individuals in a 
modern society-materially or intellectually. To justify personal 
autonomy, one must paint a picture of independence within a con-
text of dependence and moral responsibility-the analogy to nations 
and national sovereignty cannot do that. Our heroes of moral au-
tonomy, such as the doctor in Ibsen's An Enemy of the People, or 
Henry David Thoreau, stand apart from society only to uphold the 
deepest values of that society. No comparable examples among na-
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tions spring to mind. To find individuals who embody the strong 
notion of national sovereignty one looks to anti-heroes: perhaps 
J.R. Ewing. 
Professor Feinberg is well aware of these arguments against his 
position. He uses similar arguments to cast doubt upon Kant's ac-
count of personal autonomy, which relies heavily on religious and 
military metaphors. The difficulty is to construct a strong virtue of 
personal independence that yields no hostages to those who would 
march down the slippery slope of paternalism. An account which 
treasures not pure individual choice, but some abstract virtue such 
as the rationality within the individual choice, leaves room for state 
intervention. If we value Kant's strong notion of rationality, we 
may interfere with the individual's choice if it fails to select the 
most rational alternative. National sovereignty values individual 
choice in its full arbitrariness, and so fits coherently with a rejection 
of paternalism, but I suspect that the analogy of national sover-
eignty, far from lending strength to the liberal case against paternal-
ism, borrows credibility from the rejection of paternalism that it 
will never be able to repay. 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECfUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION. By Forrest McDon-
ald. I Lawrence, Kan.: Kansas University Press. 1985. Pp. 
xiii, 293. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $9.95. 
Norman L. Rosenberg2 
"When reflecting upon government," muses Professor Forrest 
McDonald, Americans have typically followed "the almost mystical 
habit of thinking of threes." Related to classical political theory 
and traditional social thought, this "habit may [also] have stemmed 
from the concept of the Holy Trinity . . . . " Is it something more 
than a historiographical fact, then, that Novus Ordo Seclorum is 
Professor McDonald's third book about the Constitution, our most 
sacred political document? 
In line with the bicentennial spirit, McDonald waxes more rev-
erential than in his earlier volumes. Both We The People (1958), 
I. Professor of History, University of Alabama. 
2. Professor of History, Macalester College. 
